Introduction
In July 2007, Mexican microfinance institution (MFI) Compartamos sold 30% of its shares in an initial public offering (IPO) that was oversubscribed 13 times and netted US$467 million for the original investors. The spectacle of what was once a socially-motivated organization generating huge profits for its investors sparked an intense debate in the microfinance community over the direction microfinance had taken in recent years. One thing the Compartamos IPO made clear is that microfinance had finally entered the world of mainstream finance.
The Compartamos IPO was in fact just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to investments in microfinance institutions. Drawn by the potential for social as well as financial returns and the opportunity to add depth to their portfolios, investors have flocked to microfinance in recent years. According to the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), total funds mobilized by microfinance investment vehicles grew five-fold from 2003 to 2007, from US$600 million to US$3.1 billion (Reille, 2007) .
The wave of private equity in microfinance was slow to reach Indian shores. Until recently, Indian MFIs relied almost exclusively on debt as a source of funds with outside investment contributing a very small share of overall financing. According to a 2005 survey conducted by the microfinance rating agency Micro-credit Ratings International Limited (M-CRIL), leverage ratios of Indian MFIs had risen to "astronomical levels," with only 4 of the 8 largest MFIs having a capital adequacy ratio in excess of 12%. In addition, a large portion of the equity of the Indian MFIs surveyed in M-CRIL's report came from donor financing rather than paid-in equity (M-CRIL, 2005) .
The situation has changed considerably over the past two years, with the creation of several new local microfinance-focused investment funds and a significant increase in the asset bases of existing microfinance focused funds. In addition, a raft of new deals were announced in 2007 and the first half of 2008, many at extremely high valuations. While the rate of new deals has slowed considerably in the wake of the global financial crisis, investors are still keenly eyeing the faster growing MFIs.
In this report we document the recent rise in equity investment in Indian microfinance and describe the process of obtaining equity financing and working with investors in detail. At the end of the report, we briefly describe two new alternative methods of financing for MFIsportfolio buyouts and securitisation.
Recent Trends in Equity Investment in Indian Microfinance
From a slow start in 2006, equity investment in Indian microfinance has skyrocketed over the past three years. The total amount of funds invested in the sector grew by 390% from FY0607 to FY0708 and by 61% from FY0708 to FY0809.
Source: Information provided by fund managers, fund websites, and various news articles.
Recent research from CGAP reveals that not only was there a surge in the number of deals in the Indian microfinance sector, but also that the prices investors paid for shares in Indian
MFIs were among the highest in the world. In a study analysing prices investors paid for equity stakes in MFIs across the world, the authors found that investors valued Indian MFIs, in price per book value terms, significantly higher than MFIs of any other country (Kneiding et al, 2009 ).
This growth in equity investment has been fuelled by a concomitant growth in investment funds targeting the sector. Over the course of FY0708 and FY0809, two new funds specifically targeting Indian microfinance, Aavishkar Goodwell and the India Financial Inclusion Fund, were created. Two existing microfinance focused funds which invest primarily in India -Unitus Equity Fund and Lok Capital -significantly increased their asset base. And several mainstream private equity players, most with no previous experience investing directly in microfinance institutions, invested in Indian MFIs. This last trend is especially significant considering the relatively large amounts of capital available to these investors compared to the microfinance focused funds. As the charts below show, while microfinance focused funds have chalked up a much greater number of deals than mainstream private equity players, mainstream private equity players have collectively supplied a majority of the equity financing to Indian MFIs over the past few years. This is not to deny the importance of the microfinance focused funds which provide a very important source of early risk capital and help nurture early stage MFIs, but does indicate that mainstream private equity players will most likely play an increasingly important role in directly financing MFIs in the future. Further, microfinance proponents have long argued that microfinance as an asset class deserves special attention due to its low beta, or low correlation between the performance of microfinance assets and the overall economy. This claim first achieved prominence in the wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1996 when Bank Rakyat Indonesia, an Indonesian bank with a large microfinance portfolio, managed to escape the crisis relatively unscathed. Recently, academic research has given some tentative support for this claim. 1 Although no formal 1 Krauss and Walter find that the performance of MFIs which provide information to the Microfinance Information Exchange exhibits relatively low correlation with national GDP and very low correlation with global markets. Due to limits of the dataset used by the authors though (for example, the authors are forced to rely on accounting data
research has yet been conducted on the impact of the global financial crisis on repayment rates of microloans, anecdotally it appears that there has been little reduction in the repayment rates of microfinance loans in most areas of the world. 2 In India, where microfinance remains a predominantly rural phenomenon and extremely few borrowers participate in the formal economy, it is likely that the beta of microfinance assets is even lower than for microfinance assets from other countries.
Yet interviews with investors revealed that while the fundamentals of Indian microfinance are undoubtedly sound, there are still several issues dampening enthusiasm in the sector by potential investors. Investors complained of weak governance, excessive reliance on "key men,"
and low quality management information systems as problems endemic in the industry. Some investors, with the lessons of the subprime crisis fresh in their minds, are particularly anxious about the lack of information regarding multiple borrowing in the industry. These investors worry that in the context of sparse information sharing among MFIs, the frenetic growth of the industry could lead to a situation where clients take on too much debt and a crisis eventually ensues. Other investors expressed concern that banks would poach MFIs' clients as they increasingly try to reach out to bottom of the pyramid clients due to pressure from India's central bank. A few investors, though not all, worry about the possibility of another political crisis such as that which occurred in Andhra Pradesh in 2006. 3 In terms of future growth, the global financial crisis will, no doubt, slow the pace of new investments in Indian microfinance over the short to medium term. Ominously, not a single new deal was announced in the final quarter of fiscal year 2008-09. Yet the impact of the global financial crisis should not be overstated. Fund managers interviewed by the authors asserted that while they were being slightly more "patient" in selecting deals, they were still actively looking for investments and many stated that they have deals in the pipeline. Fund managers further rather than stock prices due to the very limited number of MFIs which have had IPOs), care should be taken in interpreting these results. (Krauss and Walter, 2008) asserted that while raising funds had become more difficult in the current environment, it was by no means impossible. Given that, at the back end, many of the investors in the microfinance focused funds are international financial institutions such as the International Finance
Corporation and development banks such as KfW Bankengruppe and FMO, which are unlikely to be severely hurt by the financial crisis, this is not too surprising.
Prerequisites to Receiving Equity Investment
The remainder of this report, excluding the final section, is intended to serve as a rough guide for how to navigate the process of raising equity capital. In this section we describe two key steps MFIs must take prior to reaching out to potential investors to ensure that they will be seen as viable, attractive investment opportunities. These steps are certainly not intended to be exhaustive -there are many other things MFIs could do to make themselves more attractive to potential investors -but, in our view, these steps are the most essential.
Become a Non-Banking Finance Company (NBFC)
The first and most crucial step to potentially receiving equity investment is attaining 
The Process of Raising Equity Capital
Despite the increased availability of investment funds for microfinance, raising capital from outside investors can still be a daunting process for the uninitiated. In this section, we describe in detail the process of raising a single round of equity capital for an MFI. In places, we provide advice to MFIs based on interviews with MFIs which have gone through this process.
Before delving into the equity raising process, it is important to note the importance of finding domestic sources of capital. NBFCs that are not listed on a public stock exchange fall under the regulatory purview of RBI. RBI's Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) has set up the following foreign direct investment (FDI) rules for start-up companies not traded publicly on a stock exchange, which includes NBFCs:
• FDI can be up to 51% for companies with USD $.5 million or less in capitalization
• FDI must be below 75% for companies with USD $.5 -$5 million in capitalization
• FDI can be above 75% for companies with USD $50 million or more in capitalization
International investors that set up local semi-independent funds for investing in India (e.g., Blackstone, Sequoia Capital) possess foreign origins, and therefore fall under the above restrictions for foreign capital. According to practitioners that the authors discussed this issue with, the two main sources for domestic capital are currently SIDBI and NABARD, and emerging local microfinance focused funds such as Bellwether Microfinance Fund and Aavishkaar Goodwell. Finding domestic sources of capital can be difficult, and therefore when going through the equity raising process, practitioners should identify potential domestic sources of capital early on in the process.
Preliminary Note on Time Required to Raise Equity
Raising equity is a lengthy process which requires substantial attention from senior management. According to Jaydeep Chakrabarty of Unitus Capital, raising a first round of equity typically takes between three to six months and consumes 30-50% of the Chief Executive
Officer's time. Later rounds of equity take less time as the MFI is more comfortable with the process and existing investors are often willing to supply a substantial portion of new equity needs, but the process still lasts at least a few weeks.
Due to the large effort required to raise capital, MFIs typically attempt to sell enough equity stake in each round of capital raising to finance roughly 18 to 24 months of expansion.
(Most investors are only willing to provide enough equity for at most two years of growth in a single round.)
Guides to the Capital Raising Process
Raising equity can be a bewildering process for those who have never been through it before. MFIs' relative lack of experience in capital raising process can leave them at a substantial Additionally, such services can suggest innovative structuring arrangements such as buy-backs to allow MFIs to reach final agreement with potential investors.
That said, when selecting an advisory service, microfinance practitioners should have a clear understanding of how the advisory service will assist in the equity raising process. Outlining the specific activities that an advisory service will provide support for, before partnering with such a service, can help both parties understand expectations.
Step 1: Develop a Business Plan
An MFI's business plan will be the key element investors use to evaluate a potential investment in an MFI. In addition, a business plan serves an important internal purpose: it helps the MFI to estimate how much capital it will need to achieve its growth targets and thus how much equity stake it should sell.
The business plan an MFI shares with potential investors should include three key components: historic financial and operational data, future growth projections, and non-financial information.
Gather Historic Financial and Operational Data
Potential investors want access to core numbers that help indicate the growth and operational efficiency of a microfinance institution. At a high level, an MFI's ability to provide key financials exhibits an MFI's transparency and accounting standards. Moreover, if an MFI has only recently become a non-banking financial company (NBFC), an MFI's ability to clearly document its financial history is especially important. Past financial history should include the following broken down on a monthly basis: 1) total branches, 2) total centres, 3) number of clients, 4) loans outstanding, 5) average loan size, 6) asset size, 7) equity size and investor information (if applicable), and 8) expenditures (e.g., total salary costs, leasing costs, administrative overhead).
Estimate Future Growth
MFIs can help potential investors understand their growth by providing a financial model which includes such projections. The MFI should include estimated values for the key indicators (e.g., number of clients, loans outstanding, staff numbers/expenses etc.) highlighted in the MFI's past financial and operational history. Using such a strategy creates continuity between past and projected numbers, which makes it easier for potential investors to follow.
According to Samit Ghosh, founder and CEO of the MFI Ujjivan, a key element of any MFI's future projections should be a timeline for raising future sales of equity, not just the equity being sold in the current round of capital raising. Creating a calendar for future equity needs helps set expectations and reassures investors that the MFI has a long term vision for expansion. 5 (Ghosh, 2009) As mentioned earlier, MFIs typically attempt to sell enough equity in each round of capital raising to finance 18 to 24 months of expansion. In estimating equity needs, MFIs should also be mindful of the minimum capital adequacy ratios prescribed by the RBI for NBFCs -10% for NBFCs with assets less than 100 crore and 12% for NBFCs with assets 100 crore or above (to be raised to 15% on 1 st April, 2010). 6
Future projects need not be limited to one set of numbers. MFIs may create several set of projections based on alternate assumptions. According to Anurag Agrawal, head of Intellecap's investment banking advisory services team, developing alternate scenario-based projections helps investors to conduct sensitivity analysis.
Compile Non-Financial Information
In the words of Anurag Agrawal, a business plan is "more than just numbers." In addition to historic data and future growth projections, MFIs should also provide investors with a clear mission statement and, if applicable, specific information on how the MFI intends to fulfil social objectives. For example, an MFI may list the low-income areas to which it seeks to expand, or present a target for percentage of clients that fall below the poverty line that it wishes to reach.
Investors and other interviewees we spoke to stressed that non-financial information can be just as important as financial information in investors' decision of whether to make a bid on an MFI. Inclusion of such information can also help set clear expectations between the MFI and investors to help minimise future misunderstandings. For example, if the MFI has a strong social mission, articulating this clearly in the mission statement and growth plan can attract sociallyminded investors and also make clear to for-profit investors that the MFI cares about more than just achieving high profits.
4.4.
Step 2 Researchers at CGAP and JP Morgan have made a valiant effort to address this gap by compiling private data on MFI equity transactions throughout the world. As mentioned earlier, the authors found that the average price to book value for deals involving Indian MFIs was 6.7 -significantly higher than the comparable figure for any other region. Yet due to relatively short history of significant equity investment in Indian microfinance and the those interviewed in this article recommended using all of the major valuation methodologies and several different scenarios for growth to arrive at a final range of values.
Step 3: Reach out to Potential Investors
Once it has put together a clear business plan and estimated its own worth, the MFI is finally ready to reach out to potential investors. Most of the people interviewed for this report recommended that MFIs adopt a targeted approach to selecting which investors to contact, which would mean evaluating the pool of potential investors and only contacting the few likely best matches. According to our interviewees, interacting with potential investors requires substantial time and energy, and if too many investors are contacted initially, the process can quickly become unmanageable. exuberance environment during which most of the deals included in the dataset were presumably consummated, readers are cautioned that the this benchmark may be significantly over-optimistic.
Size of Equity Investment by Investor Type
As mentioned in the next section, in addition to providing capital microfinance-focused funds also can serve as a valuable resource for the MFI's management team as they work through operational challenges (e.g., developing a strong management information system (MIS) and determine the best strategic plan for the MFI. Later, as the financing needs of the MFI outstrips the funding potential of this class of investors, MFIs can turn to mainstream private equity players (Ghosh, 2009 and private interview with Ghosh). A second, but not less important, criterion in evaluating potential investors is the philosophy and social objectives of the investor.
After receiving an MFI's business plan, investors typically respond with requests for additional information. If sufficiently interested in the MFI, a potential investor will conduct a site visit which may last anywhere from 2 days to a week. During this time, the investor will want to see the operations in a typical branch, accounting at the head office, and the MFI's management information system.
Finally, if an investor decides to make a bid on the purchase of the MFI's equity, it will submit a "term sheet" which contains all details of the investor's bid. Such information includes the amount of equity the investor seeks to purchase; the amount the investor is willing to pay;
and any requirements the investor may have such as call or put options on the stock, or that the stock be issued by preferred shares rather than common stock. Moreover, the term sheet may include other operations-related requests that are part of the investor's bid, including:
• Veto rights on key decisions (e.g., changing the capital structure, hiring a new CEO)
• Board seats (i.e., investor usually requests one seat, sometimes two)
• Quarterly updates on financials These conditions will depend on the individual investor, and the existing level of corporate governance at the MFI. If the investor feels that an MFI's governance is strong, they will likely be less concerned with these more detailed term requirements. 8 [See Appendix C for a sample term sheet outline and links to example term sheets]
Step 4: Negotiate with Interested Investors
Once it has received bids from interested investors, the MFI's job is far from over.
Negotiating with interested investors can be a long and complicated process. MFIs must juggle diverse demands from multiple actors to arrive at a single price-and-deal structure to which all investors can agree.
There was no clear consensus among those interviewed for this report on the best approach to negotiations with investors. Some recommended a one-on-one approach with the most "attractive" bid, where the "attractiveness" of the bid depended not only on the price, but also on other factors such as the amount of support the investor could provide. Using this approach, one MFI conducted one-on-one negotiations with the investor with the most "attractive" bid and then tried to sell the deal agreed on with this investor to other interested investors. Others thought this one-on-one approach impractical, recommending instead that
MFIs engage multiple investors in a transparent manner from the beginning of negotiations.
Having a next best alternative, in this case another potential investor, may be beneficial during the negotiation process.
Working with Investors
Working with investors often differs considerably from working with lenders. In the section below, we broadly describe what it is like to work with each of the two typical types of investors currently active in the Indian microfinance sector: microfinance focused funds and mainstream private equity funds. It should be remembered that each individual investor is unique and may not conform to the general descriptions below. For example, while mainstream private equity firms as a whole tend to focus less on social objectives than microfinance focused funds, some mainstream private equity firms rate social objectives as a high priority.
Microfinance Focused Funds
To the authors' best knowledge, there are currently seven organisations which specifically target the microfinance sector for investment and which have invested directly in an Indian MFI: provide support in a range of areas, from upgrading the MFI's management information systems to recruiting senior management to accessing additional sources of finance. Indeed, many of the MFIs we spoke to indicated that they interact with these investors as frequently as every week to seek advice on important management decisions.
In addition, microfinance funds often impose additional reporting requirements on the While additional reporting requirements may appear intrusive and unnecessary at face value, management of microfinance investment funds we spoke with insisted that in most cases these reporting requirements simply reflected the MFIs' own social objectives as outlined in their mission statements.
Mainstream Private Equity Funds
While the majority of equity deals in Indian microfinance to date have been financed by microfinance focused funds, mainstream private equity funds have also begun to enter the sector.
To the authors' best knowledge, over the past two years, six mainstream private equity funds 9 While we label these organizations as "microfinance focused funds" several of them have invested in organizations other than MFIs. For example, Bellwether has invested in A Little World, a maker of biometric and mobile platforms technology for recording microfinance and other transactions targeted for low-income households. Similarly, Unitus has invested in COMAT, which provides e-governance solutions. In addition, Michael and Susan Dell Foundation is primarily a grant-giving organization but has made investments in Indian MFIs in the past. Moreover, what mainstream private equity funds lack in microfinance expertise they make up with deep pockets. Mainstream private equity funds have access to much larger fund bases than microfinance focused funds. For example, Blackstone manages over USD$120 billion in funds globally and their minimum deal size for the Indian market is USD$50 million.
Some in the microfinance community have raised concerns that mainstream private equity players may pressure MFIs to adopt strategies which focus too heavily on profit maximisation and thus move the industry further away from the social mission on which it was founded. While it is impossible to draw firm conclusions at this early stage, we uncovered no specific examples in which a mainstream private equity investor exerted pressure on an MFI investee in this way during the course of our interviews.
Alternate Sources of Financing
In addition to debt and equity, several MFIs have obtained financing through portfolio buyouts and securitisation in recent years. While these financing mechanisms are fundamentally different from equity investments, warranting their own full report, we include a brief overview of these topics as they may be of interest to MFIs seeking additional options for obtaining financing other than debt.
Portfolio Buyouts
A portfolio buyout occurs when a bank (or other agent) purchases the rights to the future payment stream from a set of loans granted by the MFI. Portfolio buyouts have risen in popularity in recent years as they provide a relatively easy way for banks to "cherry pick" the MFI's portfolio for those loans which meet its priority sector lending requirements. 10
Portfolio buyout contracts typically include a clause which specifies that the MFI is responsible for making up any loss in repayment up to a certain percentage of the overall portfolio (typically 10%). This clause, also known as a "first loss default guarantee", is seen as essential to ensuring that the MFI retains the correct incentives to collect on these loans. It is important to note that MFIs can only sell off as much of their portfolio as is financed by accumulated earnings or equity, not term loans from banks, in a portfolio buyout. This is because the payment stream from those micro-loans is already guaranteed to the bank which granted the term loan. Also, because the financing obtained through a portfolio buyout as well as the microloans themselves purchased through the buyout do not show up on the MFI's balance sheet, portfolio buyouts are a form of "off-balance sheet financing."
For MFIs interested in having their portfolio bought out, good financial performance is key. As Spencer Dudley of IFMR Capital explained during an interview with the authors, portfolio at risk, default rate, and volatility of defaults should be sufficiently low. Interested MFIs should also have up-to-date, audited financial statements.
10 The RBI's priority sector requirements stipulate that 13.5% of domestic banks' net credit must go directly toward agricultural purposes and 10% must go toward "weaker sections". Banks that fail to meet this target are required to deposit the shortfall with NABARD, a public sector bank focused on agricultural lending, for which they receive below-market rates of interests (typically 3.5% to 6% depending on the size of the shortfall). Loans which a bank purchases from an MFI through a portfolio buyout shift from the MFI's books to the banks and thus qualify towards these targets despite the fact that the bank did not play a role in originating the loan.
In addition, strong management and management information systems (MIS) are important. Regarding management, an MFI should have a capable CEO and other senior managers should also be very competent. That way, if an MFI loses its CEO, banks can be confident that the MFI will continue to operate effectively. Having a strong MIS provides banks assurance that management can monitor performance adequately, and is especially important for a rapidly expanding MFI. In addition, an MIS adds value for potential portfolio buyouts if the system can track a specific group of loans (e.g., the portfolio of micro-loans that a bank wishes to purchase). If the system includes information that allows loans to qualify as "direct agriculture"
or "weaker sections" under RBI's priority sector reporting guidelines, banks find these loan types particularly valuable.
Securitisation
In microfinance, securitisation of microloans refers to a transaction in which the repayments from a set of microloans from one or more MFIs are packaged into a special purpose vehicle, from which tradeable securities are issued. 11 For the MFI, there is little practical difference between securitizing a portion of its loan portfolio and selling it off directly to a bank via a portfolio buyout. In both cases, the MFI retains a first loss default guarantee and is obligated to continue to collect repayments on the sold off loans. Similarly, with both securitisations and portfolio buyouts, MFIs can only sell off as much of their portfolio as they have financed through accumulated earnings and equity. The main differience is that securitisations require a rating, while a portfolio buyout does not, and that the ability to re-sell securitised microloans may attrract more potential buyers.
Proponents of securitisation argue that it holds great potential for decreasing cost of funds to MFIs by allowing for more complex structuring of the underlying product; by providing easier secondary sales of the assets; and by reaching out to new types of potential investors. With portfolio buyouts, there is only one buyer and one seller in each transaction. With securitisation, it is possible (though it has not happened to date), to pool together loans from different MFIs to diversify risk. It is also possible to slice the securitised portfolio up into different tranches with different levels of seniority to cater to the different risk appetites of investors. Further, the standardised nature of the product means it is easier for the original purchases of the security to resell the asset. Lastly, through securitisation, MFIs may be able to tap new sources of investment funds. Certain types of large investors, especially mutual funds, are barred from directly investing or lending to MFIs but not from investing in the securitised microfinance loan assets.
To date, to the authors' knowledge, there has been only one true securitisation of microloans in the world. In March 2009, microfinance lender Equitas, in collaboration with IFMR Capital, completed a securitisation of a portion of Equitas' microloan portfolio worth Rs.
157 million. A key element of the deal was that the securities were divided into two tranches. A senior tranche comprised 80% of the portfolio and was sold to institutional investors, while a junior tranche consisting of the remaining 20% was sold to IFMR Capital. This arrangement effectively means that IFMR Capital holds the second loss default guarantee for the loans.
As the United States subprime crisis has demonstrated, securitisation may lead to systemic risks if proper precautions are not taken. While it is tempting to draw parallels between the securitisation of microfinance loans and the securitisation that took place in the United States subprime mortgage market, there are several major differences between the two situations. First and most importantly, in the subprime market, the originator of the loans often had no "skin in the game" once the loan was sold. In contrast, through the use of the first loss default guarantee clause, MFIs remain liable for a large portion of loan repayment and are thus incentivised to collect on repayments. Second, microfinance securitisation deals in India, indeed all securitisation deals in India, are much less complex than the intricate, multi-layered transactions which occurred in the subprime in the United States and which led to such confusion. Third, it should be remembered that the underlying assets, and the way in which loans are approved, are very different. In the United States subprime market, lenders often granted mortgages simply on the basis of a credit score without any real interaction with the borrower. In microfinance, the joint liability of groups has been proven as an effective screening mechanism.
Ratings
With both portfolio buyouts and securitisation, the assets sold can obtain a rating. 12 In the case of a portfolio buyout, the asset rated is the total loan portfolio which is sold. In the case of securitisation, each tranche of securities created in the deal is rated separately. Ratings are conducted by an external rating agency, such as Credit Rating Information Services of India Limited (CRISIL), which conducts extensive analysis of such factors as historical repayment rates of the microloans of the MFI to assign a final letter rating to the assets.
Obtaining a rating allows banks and other investors to purchase the assets with more confidence as they have a third party opinion of the relative riskiness of the asset. For banks, purchasing an asset which has been rated by an approved rating agency holds an additional benefit. Under the BASEL II banking norms which the RBI has subscribed to, assets which have been rated by an approved rating agency are considered less risky than unrated assets when calculating capital for capital adequacy requirements. Effectively, this means that it is cheaper for Indian banks to hold an asset which has been rated than an unrated asset.
Potential Legal Complications
On 12 12 In microfinance, ratings may also refer to a rating of the microfinance institution as whole. The term "rating", as used here, implies a rating of a portfolio of microloans or set of securities backed by repayments on microloans. • Identifying the NBFC that you would like to acquire.
Appendix A: Becoming an NBFC
• Conducting financial and reputational due diligence -do not want bad prior history to be associated with your company.
• Agreeing on a premium for the license purchase. The price depends on geography because the price is higher in southern states where microfinance is more established. Typically, the price is between Rs. 6 to 10 lakhs (~USD $12,000 -$20,000).
• Undergoing process of transferring assets and bank accounts from old MFI structure (e.g., trust, section 25 company) to the new NBFC.
• Creating a new Board.
There are also significant regulatory requirements involved in the NBFC licensing process. In Mr. Narismham's experience, when you combine the steps above with RBI regulatory approval steps, the process of purchasing an old NBFC license typically takes 6-12 months to complete. To help frame the regulatory licensing process, below we outline requirements for a new NBFC license and the purchase of an old NBFC license: Deemed liquidation: A sale of all or substantially all of the Company's assets or a merger or consolidation of the Company with any other company will be treated as a liquidation of the Company.
Redemption:
Outstanding shares of Series A Preferred will be redeemable at the election of holders of a majority of the outstanding Series A Preferred in three equal annual installments commencing six years from the date of purchase. The redemption price will be the purchase price plus declared dividends from the closing date.
Conversion:
The Series A Preferred may be converted at any time, at the option of the holder, into shares of common stock. The conversion rate will initially be 1:1, subject to anti-dilution and other customary adjustments.
Automatic conversion:
Each share of preferred stock will automatically convert into common stock, at the then applicable conversion rate, upon (i) the closing of a firmly underwritten public offering of common stock at a price per share that is at least $20.00 (a "Qualified Public Offering"), or (ii) the consent of the holders of at least 66% of the then outstanding shares of the preferred stock.
Anti-dilution:
Adjustments. The conversion price of the Series A Preferred will be subject to adjustment, on a broad-based weighted-average basis, if the Company issues additional securities at a price per share less than the then applicable conversion price.
Exceptions. There will be no adjustment to the conversion price for:
• shares issued upon conversion of the Series A Preferred;
• shares or options, warrants or other rights issued to employees, consultants or directors in accordance with plans, agreements or similar arrangements, but not to exceed a total of {_______} shares issued after the closing date or such greater number as approved by the board; • shares issued upon exercise of options, warrants or convertible securities; General voting rights:
Each share of preferred stock will have the right to a number of votes equal to the number of shares of common stock issuable upon conversion of each such share of preferred stock..
Voting for directors:
The holders of Series A Preferred will be entitled to elect one director. The holders of common stock will be entitled to elect two directors. Any additional directors will be elected by the holders of preferred stock and common stock voting together.
Protective provisions:
Consent of the holders of at least 50% of the Series A Preferred will be required to:
• alter any provision of the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws if it would adversely alter the rights, preferences, privileges or powers of or restrictions on the preferred stock or any series of preferred; • approve any merger, sale of assets or other corporate reorganization or acquisition; • approve the voluntary liquidation or dissolution of the Company; or • declare or pay any dividend or distribution or approve any repurchase with respect to the preferred stock (except as provided in the certificate of incorporation) or the common stock (subject to customary exceptions).
INVESTOR RIGHTS Registration rights:
Registrable securities. The common stock issued or issuable upon conversion of the preferred stock will be "Registrable Securities."
Demand registration. Subject to customary exceptions, holders of at least 50% of the Registrable Securities will be entitled to demand that the Company effect up to two firmly underwritten registrations (provided that each such registration has an offering price of at least $10.00 per share and has aggregate proceeds of at least $20,000,000) at any time following the earlier of (i) five years following the closing of the financing and (ii) 180 days following the Company's initial public offering.
"Piggyback" registration. The holders of Registrable Securities will be entitled to "piggyback" registration rights on any registered offering by the Company on its own behalf or on behalf of selling stockholders, subject to customary exceptions.
Expenses. Subject to customary exceptions, the Company will bear the registration expenses (exclusive of underwriting discounts and commissions) of all demand and piggyback registrations, provided that the Company will not be required to pay the fees of more than one counsel to all holders of Registrable Securities.
Termination. The registration rights of a holder of Registrable Securities will terminate on the earlier of (i) such date, on or after the Company's initial public offering, on which such holder may immediately sell all shares of its Registrable Securities under Rule 144 during any three-month period and (ii) three years after the initial public offering.
Transfer. Registration rights may be transferred by a holder of Registrable Securities to current and former partners and members, and affiliates of that holder and to other persons acquiring at least {_______} shares of the Company's outstanding capital stock, provided the Company is given written notice.
Right of first refusal:
In the event proposes to transfer any common stock, the Company will have a right of first refusal to purchase any or all the shares on the same terms as the proposed transfer.
If the Company does not exercise its right of first refusal, holders of Series A Preferred will have a right of first refusal (on a pro rata basis based on the Company's outstanding securities (on an as-converted and as-exercised basis)) with respect to the proposed transfer.[ Rights to purchase any unsubscribed shares will be reallocated pro rata among the other eligible holders of Series A Preferred.]
The rights of first refusal will be subject to customary exceptions and will terminate on a Qualified Public Offering.
Director liability:
The directors will be entitled to customary indemnification from the Company and reimbursement of reasonable costs of attendance at board meetings. The Company will also obtain D&O insurance reasonably satisfactory to the Company and its directors.
Information rights:
The Company will deliver to each holder of at least {_______} shares of Series A Preferred:
• unaudited annual financial statements within 120 days following year-end; • unaudited quarterly financial statements within 45 days following quarter-end; and • annual operating plans 30 days before each fiscal year.
[Holders of at least {_______} shares will be entitled to inspection rights.]The information rights will terminate upon an initial public offering.
EMPLOYEE MATTERS

Vesting of employee shares:
Subject to the discretion of the board, shares and options issued to employees, directors and consultants will be subject to fouryear vesting, with 25% vesting on the first anniversary of the commencement of services and the remainder vesting monthly thereafter. The Company will have the right, upon termination of services, to repurchase any unvested shares.
Proprietary information agreements:
The Company will have all employees and consultants enter into proprietary information and inventions agreements.
